

The Roles of Unrecognized Monkeypox Cases, Contact Isolation and Vaccination in Determining Epidemic Size in Belgium: A Modeling Study

Peer-reviewed author version

Van Dijck, Christophe; HENS, Niel; Kenyon, Chris & Tsoumanis, Achilleas (2023)  
The Roles of Unrecognized Monkeypox Cases, Contact Isolation and Vaccination in Determining Epidemic Size in Belgium: A Modeling Study. In: CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 76 (3) , p. e1421-e1423.

DOI: 10.1093/cid/ciac723

Handle: <http://hdl.handle.net/1942/38762>

1 **The roles of unrecognized monkeypox cases, contact isolation and vaccination in determining**  
2 **epidemic size in Belgium. A modelling study**

3

4 Christophe Van Dijck, MD\*

5 Niel Hens, PhD

6 Chris Kenyon, MD PhD\*

7 Achilleas Tsoumanis, MSc

8

9 Author affiliations:

10 Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium (C. Van Dijck, C. Kenyon, A. Tsoumanis);  
11 University of Antwerp, Belgium (C. Van Dijck, A. Tsoumanis, N. Hens); University of Cape Town,  
12 Observatory 7700, South Africa (C. Kenyon); and Hasselt University, Hasselt, Belgium (N. Hens)

13

14 \*Corresponding author. HIV/STI Unit, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nationalestraat 155, Antwerp,  
15 2000, Belgium. Tel: +32 3 345 58 65; Fax: +32 3 2480831; E-mail: cvandijck@itg.be

16 \*Alternate corresponding author. HIV/STI Unit, Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nationalestraat 155,  
17 Antwerp, 2000, Belgium. Tel: +32 3 2480796; Fax: +32 3 2480831; E-mail: ckenyon@itg.be

18

19 Running title: Monkeypox in Belgium: a network model

20 Keywords: Monkeypox, mathematical model, outbreak, vaccination, MSM

21 Word count: Text: 1328 words, Abstract: 50 words, References: 12

22 **Abstract**

23 We used a network model to simulate a monkeypox epidemic among men who have sex with men. Our  
24 findings suggest that unrecognized infections have an important impact on the epidemic, and that  
25 vaccination of individuals at highest risk of infection reduces epidemic size more than post-exposure  
26 vaccination of sexual partners.

## 27 **Background**

28 Monkeypox is a viral zoonosis whose spread was, until recently, almost exclusively limited to Central  
29 and West Africa. Since May 2022, over 41,000 cases of monkeypox have been confirmed from every  
30 continent excluding Antarctica (<https://ourworldindata.org/monkeypox>, 22 August 2022). In this multi-  
31 country outbreak, the number of cases resulting from human-to-human transmission is much higher  
32 than ever reported, and unlike the outbreaks in Africa, many cases bear several hallmarks of sexual  
33 transmission. Most cases are young men and where this information is available, typically men who  
34 have sex with men (MSM) with high rates of partner change (termed higher risk-, or HR-MSM) [1,2].  
35 Furthermore, monkeypox is frequently linked to sexual encounters and presents with localized  
36 anogenital lesions compared to the generalized skin lesions typically associated with monkeypox [1,2].  
37 We and others have noted that a sizeable proportion of cases report few, atypical, or absent symptoms  
38 [3]. This could have an important impact on transmission of the monkeypox virus. Public health  
39 recommendations to contain the epidemic include isolation of cases, requesting close contacts to abstain  
40 from sex and pre- or post-exposure (ring) vaccination of individuals at high risk of infection with a  
41 smallpox vaccine [4–6].

42 Previous modelling studies have estimated that monkeypox has epidemic potential in the general  
43 population, but that such epidemics can generally be contained by case isolation, contact tracing and/or  
44 ring vaccination [7–10]. These efforts have, thus far, been insufficient to contain the epidemic [8].

45 In this manuscript, we evaluate the impact of undiagnosed infections on a sexually associated  
46 monkeypox outbreak in an MSM sexual network, and we test the hypothesis that contact tracing or  
47 vaccination reduce the epidemic. We do this using a network-based model, parameterized with Belgian  
48 MSM behavioral data.

## 49 **Methods**

### 50 Network model

51 Building on a previously published separable temporal exponential family random graph model of a  
52 Belgian MSM population [11], we added a population of HR-MSM which was parameterized with data

53 from the cohort of HR-MSM that was included in the Preventing Resistance in Gonorrhoea (PReGo)  
54 study in Belgium [12]. The PReGo study included MSM using HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis who had  
55 a diagnosis of gonorrhoea, chlamydia or syphilis in the previous two years. The model was refined to  
56 include main and casual partnerships among low-risk (LR) and HR-MSM in terms of number of partners  
57 and frequencies of sexual encounters. Total size of the population was 10,000 MSM, 3,000 of whom  
58 were categorized as HR-MSM.

59 The next paragraphs briefly summarize the main characteristics of the inter- and intra-host processes in  
60 the model for each scenario. In every scenario, ten cases of monkeypox were introduced among HR-  
61 MSM on day 1. All scenarios were run 100 times for 720 days. For further details, references and  
62 explanations for the assumptions made, please see Supplement 1.

### 63 Baseline scenario

64 Scenario A was the baseline scenario to which the remaining scenarios were compared (Table 1).  
65 During each sexual encounter between an infectious and a susceptible individual, we assumed a 20%  
66 transmission probability of monkeypox. After a uniform incubation period of 7 days, exposed  
67 individuals became infectious for 21 days. Fifty per cent of infectious individuals were diagnosed with  
68 monkeypox after an average patient delay plus diagnostic delay of 14 days since the start of the  
69 infectious period. Diagnosed individuals ceased sexual activity for the next 28 days. The remaining  
70 undiagnosed individuals continued having sexual encounters. All cases recovered on day 21, after  
71 which lifelong immunity against reinfection was assumed.

### 72 Undiagnosed infections

73 To evaluate the impact of undiagnosed infections on the epidemic, scenario Z provided an alternative  
74 to scenario A in which 0% of infections remained undiagnosed.

### 75 Per-encounter transmission probability

76 Scenarios X and Y were identical to scenario A, except for the per-encounter monkeypox  
77 transmissibility probability, which was set to 10% and 30%, respectively.

78 Partner notification, post-exposure vaccination and pre-exposure vaccination

79 In scenarios B to I, individuals diagnosed with monkeypox notified 10% of their partners of the last 21  
80 days prior to diagnosis. All notified partners ceased sexual activity for the next 28 days. Additionally,  
81 in scenario C, notified partners of the last seven days prior to the index partner's diagnosis were  
82 vaccinated (post-exposure vaccination). In scenarios D to I, pre-exposure vaccination was done at day  
83 1 of the model, in 1% to 50% of HR-MSM. Both pre- and post-exposure vaccination were assumed to  
84 prevent infection in 85% of vaccinees and have a lifelong effectiveness against infection. Childhood  
85 smallpox vaccination was not taken into account in the model.

86 Secondary analysis

87 In a secondary analysis, we repeated all scenarios, while introducing one additional monkeypox case  
88 per week among HR-MSM, which represents an infection imported by travel.

89 **Results**

90 The baseline scenario, in which half of the monkeypox cases remained undiagnosed, resulted in a  
91 median of 1,442 (IQR 1,073 - 1,650) cases by day 720 (Table 1 and Figure S1 in Supplement 2). This  
92 was almost eight-fold higher than scenario Z, in which all cases were diagnosed (median of 185, IQR  
93 113 – 296 cases). Simulations with 10% and 30% transmission probability per sexual encounter resulted  
94 in unrealistically small (median 71, IQR 56 – 86 cases) or large (3,812, IQR 3,660 – 3,932 cases)  
95 epidemics, respectively.

96 If 10% of contacts of diagnosed cases abstained from sex (scenario B), the median number of cases by  
97 day 720 was reduced to a median of 943 (IQR 636 – 1,284), which represents a 35% reduction compared  
98 to baseline (Table 1 and Figure S2 in Supplement 2). Post-exposure vaccination of 10% of contacts  
99 (scenario C) had relatively limited additional impact (40% reduction compared to scenario A, to a  
100 median of 867, IQR 591 – 1,168 cases). It also required a median of 68 (IQR 46 – 82) contacts to be  
101 vaccinated and did not reduce epidemic duration compared to scenario B. Pre-exposure vaccination of  
102 a comparable number of HR-MSM (n = 75, scenario E) at day 1 was slightly more effective than post-  
103 exposure vaccination (reduction of 43% of cases compared to scenario A). Pre-exposure vaccination of

104 5%, 25% and 50% of HR-MSM resulted in a 56%, 91% and 95% reduction in number of cases,  
105 respectively. The epidemics in the secondary analysis including weekly import of additional  
106 monkeypox cases were much larger and more protracted, with much lower impact of all interventions  
107 on epidemic size. None the less in this analysis, pre-exposure vaccination of 150 HR-MSM reduced the  
108 epidemic size to a greater extent than post-exposure vaccination of a similar number of contacts (Table  
109 S1 in Supplement 2).

110

## 111 **Discussion**

112 The results of this model suggest that undiagnosed monkeypox infections may have an important impact  
113 on the epidemic. Secondly, our findings suggest that contact tracing helps to reduce epidemic size even  
114 if only 10% of contacts effectively ceased sexual activity. Finally, if only a small proportion of partners  
115 can be traced, post-exposure vaccination of those partners may be less effective than vaccinating a  
116 random proportion of individuals at highest risk of infection, and in our model this effect became more  
117 pronounced in scenarios with a weekly influx of new cases from other endemic/epidemic regions via  
118 travel.

119 The data presented here should be interpreted in the context of the design of the model and the  
120 assumptions made to parameterize it. We currently do not have accurate estimates of key parameters  
121 such as the proportion with unrecognized infections and the per-encounter transmission probability and  
122 how this varies according to type of (sexual) contact. Variables such as vaccine efficacy were based on  
123 sparse data from monkeypox outbreaks in endemic settings and it is unsure to what extent assumptions  
124 based on such data hold in the current epidemic of clade-IIb monkeypox virus in previously non-  
125 endemic countries. In addition, our model did not capture superspreading events, which may have  
126 played an important role in the current outbreak. Finally, we modelled a relatively limited set of  
127 parameters.

128 Network-based models such as the one used here are particularly suitable to study transmission of an  
129 infectious disease in a densely connected sexual network of MSM. They have a proven utility in  
130 modelling other STIs such as gonorrhoea and HIV [11], and are likely to provide a more accurate

131 representation of the sexual networks responsible for STI spread than the branching process models  
132 previously used to model monkeypox transmission among MSM [6,8].

133 In conclusion, our model emphasizes the need to quantify key parameters such as transmission  
134 probability, duration of infectiousness and the proportion of unrecognized monkeypox infections. Key  
135 findings are that contact tracing is worth the effort even if only a small proportion of contacts can be  
136 effectively traced and that pre-exposure vaccination of individuals at highest risk of infection has the  
137 potential to be more effective than post-exposure vaccination. In future studies, our model could be  
138 extended with features such as superspreading events, behavioral change and with refined simulations  
139 of international mobility.

140



141 **Notes**

142 Acknowledgements

143 Nil

144 Potential conflicts of interest

145 None to declare. All the authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest

146 Availability of data and materials

147 The code used for the model is available from the corresponding author

148 Funding

149 This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or  
150 not-for-profit sectors.

151 Authors' contributions

152 CK, AT and CVD conceptualized the study and, CVD and AT analyzed the data and drafted the  
153 manuscript, CK and NH revised the manuscript. All authors reviewed and approved the final  
154 manuscript.

155

156 **References**

157 1. Vivancos R, Anderson C, Blomquist P, et al. Community transmission of monkeypox in the  
158 United Kingdom, April to May 2022. *Euro Surveill* **2022**; 27:1–4.

159 2. Thornhill JP, Barkati S, Walmsley S, et al. Monkeypox Virus Infection in Humans across 16  
160 Countries — April–June 2022. *N Engl J Med* **2022**;

161 3. De Baetselier I, Van Dijck C, Kenyon C, et al. Retrospective detection of asymptomatic  
162 monkeypox virus infections among male sexual health clinic attendees in Belgium. *Nat Med*  
163 **2022**;

- 164 4. UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA). Monkeypox contact tracing classification and  
165 vaccination matrix. V10. 2022: 2–3. Available at:  
166 [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/f](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1087450/monkeypox-contact-tracing-classification-and-vaccination-matrix-version-10-1-july-2022.pdf)  
167 [ile/1087450/monkeypox-contact-tracing-classification-and-vaccination-matrix-version-10-1-](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1087450/monkeypox-contact-tracing-classification-and-vaccination-matrix-version-10-1-july-2022.pdf)  
168 [july-2022.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1087450/monkeypox-contact-tracing-classification-and-vaccination-matrix-version-10-1-july-2022.pdf). Accessed 1 July 2022.
- 169 5. Robert Koch-Institut. Epidemiologisches Bulletin. STIKO-Empfehlung zur Impfung gegen  
170 Affenpocken. 30 June 2022.
- 171 6. European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Considerations for contact  
172 tracing during the monkeypox outbreak in Europe, 2022. Stockholm: 2022.
- 173 7. Bisanzio D, Reithinger R. Projected burden and duration of the 2022 Monkeypox outbreaks in  
174 non-endemic countries. *The Lancet Microbe* **2022**;
- 175 8. Endo A, Murayama H, Abbott S, et al. Heavy-tailed sexual contact networks and the  
176 epidemiology of monkeypox outbreak in non-endemic regions, May 2022. *medRxiv* **2022**;  
177 :2022.06.13.22276353.
- 178 9. Grant R, Nguyen LBL, Breban R. Modelling human-to-human transmission of monkeypox.  
179 *Bull World Health Organ* **2020**; 98:638–640.
- 180 10. Jezek Z, Grab B, Dixon H. Stochastic model for interhuman spread of monkeypox. *Am J*  
181 *Epidemiol* **1987**; 126:1082–1092.
- 182 11. Buyze J, Vanden Berghe W, Hens N, Kenyon C. Current levels of gonorrhoea screening in  
183 MSM in Belgium may have little effect on prevalence: a modelling study. *Epidemiol Infect*  
184 **2018**; 146:333–338.
- 185 12. Van Dijck C, Tsoumanis A, Rotsaert A, et al. Antibacterial mouthwash to prevent sexually  
186 transmitted infections in men who have sex with men taking HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis  
187 (PReGo): a randomised, placebo-controlled, crossover trial. *Lancet Infect Dis* **2021**; 21:657–  
188 667.

189

190

191 **Table 1: Model scenarios and results**

Scenario	Probability of transmission per sexual encounter (%)	Proportion of undiagnosed cases (%)	Proportion of Contacts Traced (%)	PEP vaccination	PrEP vaccination = Proportion of HR-MSM vaccinated at day 1 (%)	Proportion of ongoing epidemics at day 720 (%)	Number of cases by day 720, median (IQR)	Epidemic duration, median (IQR) <sup>a</sup>	Number of people vaccinated, median (IQR)	Reduction in number of cases compared to scenario A (%)
A	20	50	0	No	0	55	1,442 (1,073 – 1,650)	720 (621 - 720)	0	REF
B	20	50	10	No	0	47	943 (636 – 1,284)	690 (566 - 720)	0	35
C	20	50	10	Yes	0	49	867 (591 – 1,168)	714 (557 - 720)	68 (46 - 82)	40
D	20	50	10	No	1	43	924 (533 – 1,229)	682 (558 - 720)	30 (30 - 30)	36
E	20	50	10	No	2.5	37	824 (493 – 1,044)	631 (494 - 720)	75 (75 - 75)	43
F	20	50	10	No	5	29	632 (327 - 865)	595 (409 - 720)	150 (150 - 150)	56
G	20	50	10	No	10	13	321 (188 - 525)	408 (280 - 596)	300 (300 - 300)	78
H	20	50	10	No	25	0	136 (95 - 195)	235 (171 - 314)	750 (750 - 750)	91
I	20	50	10	No	50	0	72 (57 - 86)	131 (105 - 157)	1,500 (1,500 – 1,500)	95
X	10	50	0	No	0	0	71 (56 - 85)	138 (114 - 190)	0	-
Y	30	50	0	No	0	2	3,812 (3,660 – 3,932)	532 (503 - 585)	0	-
Z	20	0	0	No	0	0	185 (113 - 296)	277 (198 - 404)	0	-

192 <sup>a</sup> this number represents an underestimation as epidemics that were still ongoing at day 720 were assumed to last 720 days

193 IQR = interquartile range; MSM = men who have sex with men; HR-MSM = high-risk MSM; PEP = post-exposure prophylactic (vaccination); PrEP = pre-exposure prophylactic (vaccination)

194