

ICT SECURITY MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

Security becomes more and more important and companies are aware that it has become a management problem. It's critical to know what are the critical resources and processes of the company and their weaknesses. A security audit can be a handy solution. We have developed BEVA, a method to critically analyse the company and to uncover the weak spots in the security system. BEVA results also in a general security score and security scores for each security factor. These will be used in the risk analysis.

The goal is to increase the security score S_s to a postulated level by focusing on the critical security factors, those with a low security score.

We will identify the critical threats too, being those with a high risk or expected loss for the company if they occur.

In the next stage it will be resolved to implement some security measures to decrease the probabilities of the occurrence of the threats and as a consequence to decrease the risks and to improve the security situation.

1. ICT SECURITY MANAGEMENT

As a consequence of the fast integration of technologies as Internet, Intranet, Extranet, Voice over IP and e-commerce, a companies ICT-infrastructure will move to more openness to the outside world and as a consequence will become more vulnerable for security threats. This offers lots of new opportunities but also creates new threats. That's why focus and responsibility concerning security become even more and more important. Studies show that attacks come from inside as well as from outside the organisation and bring along large costs. Because of these large costs, companies became more and more aware that they not only deal with a technical problem but also with a management problem.

ICT-security management consists of a security audit activity and of a risk analysis. Both topics will be discussed in this paper.

2. SECURITY AUDIT

Spending each year a certain amount on security measures is not enough. A company needs a total security approach. It is a must to know what are the critical resources and processes of the company and their weaknesses. A solution to this is a security audit. Based on the results of the audit, a security policy can be developed, adjusted to the company situation. A security audit can be used to analyse and describe the security level.

2.1. Our security audit checklist

We have developed a security audit, called BEVA. BEVA is a method to analyse critically the company and to uncover the weak spots of the security system.

We have developed a standard list that covers all aspects of security in the different areas or of business functions. Each of these areas consists of different security factors. The factors are in their turn tested on the basis of several questions.

We based our security analysis partly on the Marion-AP method. But our list for the security factors is based on the standard ISO 17799. The 36 security factors are spread over the 10 domains, as set forward in the standard ISO17799 model. For example you have the domain "system access control" and in this domain you have the factors: requirements for access, management of user access, user responsibility, control of network access, control access to OS, control of access to applications and information and use of mobile infrastructure.

For each of the 36 factors, a number of subcriteria are formulated. We developed a list of questions, covering the subcriteria we created. The questions are partly based on the "checklists in information management" SDU publishers. (www.riskworld.net/7799-2.htm)

| Security Factor Sfi | Importance | Sub Factor | Relevance/weight 1 to 4 | Code question | Question | evaluation 1 to 4 |
|---|------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------|--|-------------------|
| Domain: Access control | | | | | | |
| Sf20. Business requirements for access controlPremise | B | access control policymanagement | 3 | 20.1 | Is the access control policymanagement based on the business security requirements? | 3 |
| | | | | 20.2 | Are aspects of logical and physical access control included? | 3 |
| | | | | 20.3 | Is it clear for users and service providers which rules are applicable? | 2 |
| Sf21. User access management | C | registration of users | 2 | 21.1 | Is there any formal user registration and de-registration procedure for granting access to multi-user IS and services? | 1 |
| | | privilege management | 1 | 21.2 | are privileges and allocated on need-to-use basis? | 3 |
| | | | | 21.3 | are privileges only allocated after formal authorisation process? | 1 |
| | | user password management | 4 | 21.4 | should the allocation and the reallocation of passwords be controlled through a formal management process? | 3 |
| | | | | 21.5 | are the users asked to sign a statement to keep the password confidential? | 1 |
| | | review of user access rights | 3 | 21.6 | does there exist a process to review user access rights at regular intervals? | 4 |

Figure 1: Questions audit checklist

| Security factor Sfi | Security Subfactor Ssfij | Relevance /weight 1 to 4 w(i,j) | Code question | evaluation 1 to 4 | mean evaluation 1 to 4 eval(i,j) | Security factor score Sfis |
|--|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| Domain: Access control | | | | | | |
| Sf20. Business requirements for access controlPremise | access control policymanagement | 3 | 20.1 | 3 | 2,67 | 2,67 |
| | | | 20.2 | 3 | | |
| | | | 20.3 | 2 | | |
| | | 3 | | | | |
| Sf21. User access management | registration of users | 2 | 21.1 | 1 | 1 | 2,25 |
| | privilege management | 1 | 21.2 | 3 | 2 | |
| | | | 21.3 | 1 | | |
| | user password management | 4 | 21.4 | 3 | 2 | |
| | | | 21.5 | 1 | | |
| | review of user access rights | 3 | 21.6 | 4 | 3,5 | |
| 21.7 | | | 3 | | | |
| | | 10 | | | | |
| $Sfis = \frac{\sum [(w(i,j) * eval(i,j))]}{\sum w(i,j)}$ | | | | | | |

Figure 2: Calculation of the Sf I's

2.2. The audit process and the calculation of security factor scores Sfi's and the security score Ss

To collect the information about the current security situation of the company, we start with the questioning of the key persons in the company using the audit checklist questionnaire.

The company determines which systems or processes are critical for them and connected with it, which security factors are important or relevant.

An importance rate is given to the security factors from A (low importance) to E (high importance). Next a weight between 0 and 4 is allocated to the subcriteria of the security factors to indicate the relevance. Subsequently the evaluation starts and each question is given a score between 1 and 4 (see figure 1).

$$Sfi\ s = \text{sum} [\text{eval} (i,j) * w(i,j)] / \text{sum} w(i,k)$$

$$Ss = \text{sum} [\text{eval} (1,36) * w(1,36)] / \text{sum} w(1, 36)$$

For example see factor 21 in the example:

$$[2*1 + 1*2 + 4*2 + 3*3,5] / 10 = 2.25$$

Ss= in this example 2.66

| Security Factor | Weight | Sfi | Security Factor | Weight | Sfi |
|-----------------|--------|------|-----------------|--------|------|
| 1 | A | 2,25 | 19 | B | 3,5 |
| 2 | D | 3,33 | 20 | B | 2,67 |
| 3 | B | 2,75 | 21 | A | 2,25 |
| 4 | A | 3 | 22 | D | 2 |
| 5 | C | 1,75 | 23 | E | 2,33 |
| 6 | D | 2,33 | 24 | C | 2 |
| 7 | A | 2,25 | 25 | A | 2,67 |
| 8 | B | 3,25 | 26 | D | 2,5 |
| 9 | E | 2,33 | 27 | B | 1,75 |
| 10 | D | 2,67 | 28 | E | 3 |
| 11 | C | 2 | 29 | B | 3,25 |
| 12 | A | 3,67 | 30 | C | 3,33 |
| 13 | C | 3 | 31 | B | 2,75 |
| 14 | B | 2,5 | 32 | C | 2,67 |
| 15 | D | 1,67 | 33 | A | 2 |
| 16 | A | 2,67 | 34 | E | 2 |
| 17 | E | 3,33 | 35 | C | 2,5 |
| 18 | C | 2,25 | 36 | B | 3 |

Figure 3: Sfi's results

Based on the evaluated questionnaire and the allocated weights, a realistic picture of the security situation of the company can be created as well general as by factor. This is showed graphically in BEWA, see figures below. Figure 5 highlights which security factors are crucial, and points out the security factors which need immediate attention by placing them in the red area.




Figure 4: Graph of the security scores




Figure 5: Graph of security factors and their importance

Feedback is given to the company and the evaluation states immediate points of action.

A list of action points is created. Taking into account the stated security budget and the factors and their importance, an action plan is suggested.

3. RISK ANALYSIS

As stated earlier ICT security management is based on a security audit and on a risk analysis. The security audit gives us an average security score Ss for the enterprise and a SFi for each of the security factors as explained in the previous chapter. In this part we will take a closer look at the risk analysis and use the outcomes of the security audit to do our risk analysis. Our risk analysis is partly based on the Marion-AP method.

3.1. Potential losses linked with the occurrence of threats.

Companies loose large amounts of money on violations. A table which states the relation between the threats and the types of incurred losses is constructed.

Losses due to the occurrence of threats or security risks have to be measured in the company.

| Threats | Function in the company | | | | Loss |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|----------------|-----|------|
| | Type of loss 1 | Type of loss 2 | Type of loss 3 | ... | |
| T1= Virus | x | | x | | L1 |
| T2= Laptop/mobile theft | x | | | | L2 |
| T3= Insider abuse of net access | | x | | | L3 |
| ... | | | | | |

Figure 6: Threats versus losses

As types of loss we choose the categories :

- material damages and supplements
- additional costs and exploitation losses
- loss of money and material
- other losses

Other categories are possible. But what we are interested in, is the total loss for each risk (being L1, L2,L3,...).

3.2. Probability of risks

The yearly organised CSI/FBI-study delivers the following probabilities for the threats:

| Threat | (CSI/FBI 2006) | Kans | (CSI/FBI 2006) |
|--------|------------------------------------|------|----------------|
| T1 | Virus | Pt1 | 0.65 |
| T2 | Laptop/mobile theft | Pt2 | 0.47 |
| T3 | Insider abuse of net access | Pt3 | 0.42 |
| T4 | Unauthorised access to information | Pt4 | 0.32 |
| ... | | ... | |

Figure 7: Probability of risks

3.3 The risks of the threats and the list of critical threats

Our final goal is to influence the occurrence of the threats, or the probability of the occurrence of them, by implementing selective security measures in the company. This will impact in the long run the security situation.

We must concentrate on the critical security factors, following the results of the audit. If the security factor is critical, than the threats linked with it have a critical risk too.

In figure 7 we figure out the relations between the threats and the security factors.

| Threat | Security factors | | | | |
|--------|------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|-----|------|
| | Sf1 ... | Sf20: requirements for access | Sf21: mgt of user access | ... | Sf36 |
| T1 | x | x | | | |
| ... | | | | | x |
| T4 | | x | x | | |
| T5 | x | | | | |
| ... | | | | | |

Figure 8: Relations between security factors and threats

We can base our study on the probabilities found in the CSI/FBI study

We assume that the probabilities in the CSI/FBI study are averages of the security situation of a large number of companies.

Our company's security score Ss can be seen as a representative of this average situation and so the probabilities can be interpreted as being prior probabilities of our company's security situation.

We can recalculate the probabilities of the threats by weighing them with the corresponding security factor scores Sfis of the related security factors.

The security score of the threat j = STjs

Taking into account the individual security factor scores Sfis of those security factors which have a positive relation with the threat, we need to adjust the probability

By calculating the average security score of each threat and their adjusted probability.

| Threat | Ssi Probab. | Security factors | | | | Ss | Average Secur. score Risk | Adjusted probability |
|--------|-------------|------------------|-----|-----|-----|------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| | | Sf1 | Sf2 | Sf3 | ... | | | |
| T1 | P1 | x | | x | | SsT1 | P1' | |
| T2 | P2 | | | | x | SsT2 | P2' | |
| T3 | P3 | x | x | x | | SsT3 | P3' | |
| ... | | | | | | | | |

Figure 9: Adjusted probability of the threats

SsT1= the sum of all the scores of the questions of the factors that have a relation with T1 divided by the assigned weight of those factors;

$$P_i = (1-P_i) * SsT_i / S_s$$

After calculating the adjusted probability, we can now calculate the risks of the threats for our company.

| Threat | Probability | Loss | Risk |
|--------|-------------|------|----------|
| T1 | P1' | L1 | P1' * L1 |
| T2 | P2' | L2 | P2' * L2 |
| T3 | P3' | L3 | P3' * L3 |
| T4 | P4' | L4 | P4' * L4 |
| ... | | | |

Figure 10: The risk of the threats

In this table we can identify the critical risks, or the threats raising a high risk for the company.

4. DECISION ON SECURITY MEASURES

The next stage is to resolve on to security measures. First a table with the most used measures along the CSI-study.

| Most used measures (CSI-study) |
|------------------------------------|
| Firewall |
| AntiVirus Software |
| AtiSpyware Software |
| Server Based Acces control list |
| Intrusion detection system |
| Ecrption for data |
| Reusable account system |
| Intrusion prevention system |
| Log management software |
| Application level firewall |
| Smart card/one time password token |
| Specialized wireless security |
| Training personel |
| Endpoint security client software |
| Update server |
| Firewall |
| AntiVirus Software |
| AtiSpyware Software |
| Server Based Acces control list |
| Intrusion detection system |

Figure 11: Most used measures

The critical threats should be restrained by taking the necessary safety requirements. For each of the threats a security measure can be taken but it is also possible that one measure can resolve or effect several threats. It's important to evaluate the costs of the measures and the possible loss of a threat. It is obvious that the cost can't be higher than the expected loss.

| Measures | Threats Ti | | | | Costs |
|--------------|------------|----|----|-----|-------|
| | T1 | T2 | T3 | ... | |
| M1= firewall | | | | X | C1 |
| ... | | x | x | | C2 |
| | | | | | ... |
| M14 | x | | | | C14 |
| M15 | x | | | | C15 |

Figure 12: Measures for the different threats

5. FOLLOW UP

After a period of approximately 3 months after implementing the security measures, a new security audit should be taken. The new security score Ss is calculated and compared to the stated aimed Security score using the security measures.

If there are security factors that score too low, these should be investigated and adjusted;

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