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|Title:||Dividends and family governance practices in private family firms||Authors:||MICHIELS, Anneleen
|Issue Date:||2012||Source:||Belgian Financial Research Forum 2012, Antwerpen, België, 25 April 2012||Abstract:||Intra-familial principal-principal conflicts are a relevant agency problem in privatelyheld family firms. These conflicts of interest commonly occur between active and passive family shareholders, and require remedies different from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts. This article empirically examines whether or not firms use dividends as instruments to cope with conflicts of interest between active and passive family shareholders and how family governance practices moderate this relationship. The results show that the existence of an intra-familial conflict of interest results in a higher propensity to pay dividends and that the use of family governance practices strengthens this relationship. Additionally, the findings support the suggestion that using family governance practices leads to a more efficient dividend policy.||Document URI:||http://hdl.handle.net/1942/13821||Category:||C2||Type:||Conference Material|
|Appears in Collections:||Research publications|
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