Lobbying Towards A Global Standard Setter – Do National Characteristics Matter? An Analysis Of The Comment Letters Written To The IASB

Abstract

The chapter analyzed the lobbying behaviour of the different constituent parties towards the IASB. The hypotheses of Sutton (1984) that preparers lobby more often than users and large firms lobby more often than small firms are confirmed in this multinational setting. With the data resulting from a content analysis of comment letters sent in response to the exposure draft preceding the final standard IFRS 2 on share-based transactions, we were able to confirm the economic perspective theory of Watts and Zimmerman (1986). Companies that experience a negative cash flow effect from the proposed standard do indeed engage more in lobbying. Based on the same data we were also able to confirm that auditors do not always defend their clients’ position when lobbying towards the IASB, but are driven by their own incentives as well. The hypothesis of Sutton (1984) that an increase in the cost of compliance will increase the level of preparer lobby was confirmed. The results indicate that in countries with high levels of enforcement, with high judicial efficiency, and with a positive attitude towards tax compliance, companies engage more often in lobbying. With regard to the cultural variables we obtained mixed results; only the existence of large power distance influences the lobbying behaviour in a negative way. Variables relating to domestic earnings management practices and the domestic information environment of the firm have no significant influence.