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http://hdl.handle.net/1942/15323
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | CLEEMPUT, Irina | - |
dc.contributor.author | De Laet, Chris | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-07-25T09:27:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-07-25T09:27:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | HEALTH POLICY, 110 (2-3), p. 172-179 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0168-8510 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1942/15323 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Background: Treatment costs of end-stage renal disease with dialysis are high and vary between dialysis modalities. Public healthcare payers aim at stimulating the use of less expensive dialysis modalities, with maintenance of healthcare quality. Objectives: This study examines the effects of Belgian financial incentive mechanisms for the use of low-cost dialysis treatments. Methods: First, the costs of different dialysis modalities were calculated from the hospital's perspective. Data were obtained through a hospital survey. The balance between costs and revenues was simulated for an average Belgian dialysis programme. Incremental profits were calculated in function of the proportion of patients on alternative dialysis modalities. Results: Hospital haemodialysis is the most expensive modality per patient year, followed by peritoneal dialysis and finally satellite haemodialysis. Under current reimbursement rules mean profits of a dialysis programme are maximal if about 28% of patients are treated with a low-cost dialysis modality. This is only slightly lower than the observed percentage in Belgian dialysis centres in the same period. Conclusions: In Belgium, the financial incentives for the use of low-cost dialysis modalities only had a modest impact due to the continuing profits that could be generated by high-cost dialysis. Profit neutrality is crucial for the success of any financial incentive mechanism for low-cost dialysis modalities. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | ELSEVIER IRELAND LTD | - |
dc.subject.other | Health Care Sciences & Services; Health Policy & Services | - |
dc.subject.other | Costs and cost analysis; Dialysis; Economics; Reimbursement; Incentive; Health policy | - |
dc.title | Analysis of the costs of dialysis and the effects of an incentive mechanism for low-cost dialysis modalities | - |
dc.type | Journal Contribution | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 179 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2-3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 172 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 110 | - |
local.format.pages | 8 | - |
local.bibliographicCitation.jcat | A1 | - |
dc.description.notes | Cleemput, I (reprint author), Belgian Healthcare Knowledge Ctr KCE, AC Kruidtuin, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium. Hasselt Univ, Fac Business Econ Policy Management, B-3590 Diepenbeek, Belgium. Irina.Cleemput@kce.fgov.be | - |
local.publisher.place | CLARE | - |
local.type.refereed | Refereed | - |
local.type.specified | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.03.001 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | 000318332800008 | - |
item.accessRights | Restricted Access | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.validation | ecoom 2014 | - |
item.contributor | CLEEMPUT, Irina | - |
item.contributor | De Laet, Chris | - |
item.fullcitation | CLEEMPUT, Irina & De Laet, Chris (2013) Analysis of the costs of dialysis and the effects of an incentive mechanism for low-cost dialysis modalities. In: HEALTH POLICY, 110 (2-3), p. 172-179. | - |
crisitem.journal.issn | 0168-8510 | - |
crisitem.journal.eissn | 1872-6054 | - |
Appears in Collections: | Research publications |
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cleemput 1.pdf Restricted Access | Published version | 328.86 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open Request a copy |
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