Power Analysis on AES and LoRaWAN

Abstract

Side-channel attacks introduce an alternate method of attacking cryptographic algorithms by targeting the implementation of the computer system rather than the algorithm itself. One of these side-channel attacks is the power analysis attack and has shown to be successful in attacking various device implementations using cryptographic algorithms which are considered to be secure. One of these victims is the popular and well used AES algorithm. Power analysis attacks could thus provide a method to break the security of these communication channels.

However, the practicality and effectiveness of these attacks in practice are often undocumented. In this thesis, the author will try to answer to question: "Is the AES algorithm in modern IoT appliances vulnerable for power analysis attacks?" and "Are power analysis attacks usable in practice?". To answer these questions, a detailed description about the AES algorithm and power analysis attacks is provided in this thesis. Next, several case studies are performed to address the practicality and effectiveness of the power analysis attacks. During these case studies the author was able to conclude that the quality of the measurements directly affects the effectiveness of the power analysis attacks. The quality of the measurements relies on several conditions such as electrical noise and measurement set-ups.