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http://hdl.handle.net/1942/33150
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | DE MOT, Jef | - |
dc.contributor.author | Depoorter, Ben | - |
dc.contributor.author | Miceli, Thomas J | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-01-22T14:35:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-01-22T14:35:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.date.submitted | 2021-01-22T14:30:24Z | - |
dc.identifier.citation | American Law and Economics Review, 22 (2) , p. 377 -396 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1465-7252 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1942/33150 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Conventional wisdom in the economic analysis of tort law holds that legal errors distort incentives, causing behavior to depart from the optimum. If potential injurers know that courts err, they may engage in less or more than optimal precaution. This article revisits the effect of judicial error on the incentives of potential injurers by identifying a heretofore-neglected filtering effect of uncertainty in settings of imperfect judicial decision-making. We show that when courts make errors in the application of the liability standards, uncertainty about erroneous decision-making filters out the most harmful torts but leaves unaffected less harmful accidents. Our insight applies to various procedural and institutional aspects of legal adjudication, including the randomization of case assignment, the strength of precedent, and the use of standards versus rules. | - |
dc.description.sponsorship | The Author 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Law and Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model) | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | - | |
dc.subject.other | litigation | - |
dc.subject.other | torts | - |
dc.subject.other | uncertainty | - |
dc.subject.other | filtering | - |
dc.title | Filtering Tort Accidents | - |
dc.type | Journal Contribution | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 396 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 2 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 377 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 22 | - |
local.bibliographicCitation.jcat | A1 | - |
local.publisher.place | JOURNALS DEPT, 2001 EVANS RD, CARY, NC 27513 USA | - |
local.type.refereed | Refereed | - |
local.type.specified | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/aler/ahaa006 | - |
dc.identifier.isi | WOS:000612526000004 | - |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1465-7260 | - |
local.provider.type | CrossRef | - |
local.uhasselt.international | yes | - |
item.accessRights | Open Access | - |
item.fullcitation | DE MOT, Jef; Depoorter, Ben & Miceli, Thomas J (2020) Filtering Tort Accidents. In: American Law and Economics Review, 22 (2) , p. 377 -396. | - |
item.validation | ecoom 2022 | - |
item.fulltext | With Fulltext | - |
item.contributor | DE MOT, Jef | - |
item.contributor | Depoorter, Ben | - |
item.contributor | Miceli, Thomas J | - |
crisitem.journal.issn | 1465-7252 | - |
crisitem.journal.eissn | 1465-7260 | - |
Appears in Collections: | Research publications |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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8688427.pdf | Peer-reviewed author version | 467.06 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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