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http://hdl.handle.net/1942/42687
Title: | Whistle-blowing and the incentive to hire | Authors: | DE MOT, Jef Mungan, Murat C. |
Issue Date: | 2024 | Publisher: | WILEY | Source: | ECONOMIC INQUIRY, | Status: | Early view | Abstract: | We consider a previously neglected cost of whistle-blower awards: employers may base their hiring decisions, on the margin, not on the productivity of an employee but rather on the probability that the employee will become a whistle-blower. We develop a three-stage model to examine how productivity losses due to distortions at the hiring stage influence optimal whistle-blower rewards. We characterize optimal rewards for whistle-blowing, and show that when rewards can be chosen according to either the benefits of the employer from offending or the productivity of the worker being hired, productivity-based rewards are superior to benefit-based rewards. | Notes: | Mungan, MC (corresponding author), Texas A&M Univ, Sch Law, Ft Worth, TX 76102 USA. mungan@tamu.edu |
Keywords: | crime;deterrence;hiring incentives;whistle-blowing | Document URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/1942/42687 | ISSN: | 0095-2583 | e-ISSN: | 1465-7295 | DOI: | 10.1111/ecin.13212 | ISI #: | 001180489500001 | Rights: | 2024 The Authors. Economic Inquiry published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Western Economic Association International. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. | Category: | A1 | Type: | Journal Contribution |
Appears in Collections: | Research publications |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Economic Inquiry - 2024 - De Mot - Whistle‐blowing and the incentive to hire.pdf | Early view | 665.52 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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