Marine constraints as philosophical opportunities: the Krogh principle and the benefits of philosophical engagement with the sea

Abstract

This paper shows how cases drawn from the marine sciences can be particularly fruitful for philosophical reflection about the nature of science. We offer a meta-philosophical adaptation of a heuristic (the Krogh Principle) taken from comparative biology, drawing connections between a problem common to both biology and philosophy of science: how to apportion scarce attention between the bewildering array of potential study systems? And how to do so in a way which recognises the diversity of those study systems, but preserves the possibility of generalisation? The Krogh Principle offers a heuristic: choose cases where the phenomenon of interest is demonstrated in an extreme or unusual way, so as to make the phenomenon particularly accessible. We follow one particular sub-strategy, namely, the exploration of cases which are subject to strong environmental constraints, which we expect to be as fruitful in the choice of organisms as it is for scientific case studies. Marine sciences offer examples of substantial environmental constraints on scientific practice, and so present extreme and unusual examples from which philosophers can improve existing conceptual machinery to the benefit of both philosophers and scientists. In particular, we use examples from coral reef and deep-sea science to show how marine sciences can both reinforce and refine philosophical understanding of the role played by values in science. We conclude by suggesting that many other topics-in both philosophy and science-may also stand to benefit from philosophical engagement with environmentally-constrained or otherwise unusual case studies, in particular cases taken from the marine sciences.