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http://hdl.handle.net/1942/5666
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | VEREECK, Lode | - |
dc.contributor.author | MUHL, Manuela | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-12-20T16:00:55Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2007-12-20T16:00:55Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | European Journal of Law and Economics, 10(3). p. 243-268 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1261 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1942/5666 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Delay undermines the performance of courts around the world. Its implications and possible solutions, however, are not so widely understood. The assessment of the efficiency of delay as a rationing mechanism requires a general theory, which looks at the effect on the number of conflicts, suits, settlements and trials. The outcome is somewhat disturbing: delay may be socially beneficial, but the assumptions seem prohibitively strict. The policy implications are that court delay is best reduced via increases in court fees and improvements in legislative and judicial quality. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.title | An economic theory of court delay | - |
dc.type | Journal Contribution | - |
dc.identifier.epage | 268 | - |
dc.identifier.issue | 3 | - |
dc.identifier.spage | 243 | - |
dc.identifier.volume | 10 | - |
local.bibliographicCitation.jcat | A1 | - |
local.type.refereed | Refereed | - |
local.type.specified | Article | - |
dc.bibliographicCitation.oldjcat | A1 | - |
local.identifier.vabb | c:vabb:86355 | - |
dc.identifier.url | http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/ejle/2000/00000010/00000003/00276644;jsessionid=128yxsb52l0rd.alexandra | - |
item.contributor | VEREECK, Lode | - |
item.contributor | MUHL, Manuela | - |
item.validation | vabb 2010 | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
item.accessRights | Closed Access | - |
item.fullcitation | VEREECK, Lode & MUHL, Manuela (2000) An economic theory of court delay. In: European Journal of Law and Economics, 10(3). p. 243-268. | - |
Appears in Collections: | Research publications |
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