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Title: An economic theory of court delay
Authors: VEREECK, Lode 
MUHL, Manuela 
Issue Date: 2000
Source: European Journal of Law and Economics, 10(3). p. 243-268
Abstract: Delay undermines the performance of courts around the world. Its implications and possible solutions, however, are not so widely understood. The assessment of the efficiency of delay as a rationing mechanism requires a general theory, which looks at the effect on the number of conflicts, suits, settlements and trials. The outcome is somewhat disturbing: delay may be socially beneficial, but the assumptions seem prohibitively strict. The policy implications are that court delay is best reduced via increases in court fees and improvements in legislative and judicial quality.
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Link to publication:;jsessionid=128yxsb52l0rd.alexandra
Category: A1
Type: Journal Contribution
Validations: vabb 2010
Appears in Collections:Research publications

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