Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||An economic theory of court delay||Authors:||VEREECK, Lode
|Issue Date:||2000||Source:||European Journal of Law and Economics, 10(3). p. 243-268||Abstract:||Delay undermines the performance of courts around the world. Its implications and possible solutions, however, are not so widely understood. The assessment of the efficiency of delay as a rationing mechanism requires a general theory, which looks at the effect on the number of conflicts, suits, settlements and trials. The outcome is somewhat disturbing: delay may be socially beneficial, but the assumptions seem prohibitively strict. The policy implications are that court delay is best reduced via increases in court fees and improvements in legislative and judicial quality.||Document URI:||http://hdl.handle.net/1942/5666||Link to publication:||http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/ejle/2000/00000010/00000003/00276644;jsessionid=128yxsb52l0rd.alexandra||Category:||A1||Type:||Journal Contribution||Validations:||vabb 2010|
|Appears in Collections:||Research publications|
Show full item record
checked on May 20, 2022
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.